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Abstract  
This paper studies the link between macro-financial variability and bank behaviour, which 
justifies the second-round effects of the global financial crisis on East Asia. Following 
Gallego et al. (The impact of the global economic and financial crisis on Central Eastern and 
South Eastern Europe (CESEE) and Latin America, 2010), the second round effects are 
defined as the adverse feedback loop from the slumps in economic activities and sharp 
financial market deterioration, which may influence the financial performance of bank, 
inter alia via deteriorating credit quality, declining profitability and increasing problems in 
retaining necessary capitalization. Differentiating itself from other research, this study 
stresses adjustments in four dimensions of bank performance and behaviour: asset quality, 
profitability, capital adequacy, and lending behaviour, assuming that any change in a bank-
specific characteristic is induced by endogenous adjustments of the others. The empirical 
results based on partial adjustment models and two-step system GMM estimation show 
that bank’s adjustment behaviour is subject to the variation in the macro-financial 
environment and the stress condition in the global financial market. There is no convincing 
evidence to support the effectiveness of policy rate cut to boots bank lending and to avoid a 
financial accelerator effect. 
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1.  Introduction 
Problems in banking sectors have been at the epicenter of the historical economic and 
financial crises in both emerging markets and advanced economies during the past 
decades. Experiencing an expensive lesson from the financial distress of 1997-1998, East 
Asia has focused on building a resilient banking system to withstand negative shocks and 
stimulate macro-financial stability. Therefore, East Asian banks entered the global financial 
crisis in a relatively sound condition thanks to the remarkable reforms and conservative 
regulatory regime developed in the 2000s. Despite the healthy pre-crisis condition and 
limited direct exposure to US subprime mortgage credit products, following the mounting 
pressures of the global financial markets during 2007-2008, the short-term outlook of the 
Asian banking sector assessed by leading credit agencies was negative (Pomerleano, 2009). 
Table 1 summaries Moody’s average bank financial strength ratings, which reflect several 
downgrades and downward changes in outlook for major banking systems in 2008 and 
2009. Some countries, such as Hong Kong and Indonesia, were considered to have a stable 
outlook. However, according to a report from the Hong Kong Monetary Authority (HKMA) 
in 2008, the outlook of banks in Hong Kong was uncertain and less promising. Similarly, 
despite their stable outlook, Indonesian banks were assessed to be very vulnerable to 
credit risk, especially mid-sized and large banks, according to the stress tests conducted by 
the IMF in 20102. Pressure in the banking sector works through feedback loops from a 
slump in economic activities, along with a tailspin in asset prices, which may cause bank 
performance to deteriorate. Rating agencies expected the biggest threat to be the 
substantial pressure on loan quality and the potential rising non-performing loans (NPL). 
This would therefore lead to higher provisions, lower profitability and considerable 
erosion in bank capital, which may have negative implications for further lending.  
This study empirically examines how the variability in macro-financial conditions can 
influence banks’ financial soundness and behaviour, which justifies the second-round 
effects of the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 on East Asian economies. The analysis is 
based on a panel of 196 commercial banks from eight East Asian countries over the time 
period of 2005 to 2014. This paper contributes to the existing literature by stressing the 
simultaneous effects in four dimensions of bank performance: asset quality, profitability, 
capital adequacy, and loan portfolio. The assumption is that any change in bank 
performance is caused by either endogenous bank-specific factors or exogenous factors of 
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macro-financial variables. Therefore, a multi-equation instead of a single-equation 
framework is employed, taking into account partial adjustment models and the dynamic 
interactions between instruments of bank performance. This research also differentiates 
itself from previous studies by allowing the global financial stress factors, amongst the 
main drivers of bank behaviour, to control for the contagion effect from external shocks to 
East Asia. Additionally, in response to the contagion effect, central banks in Asia announced 
numerous policy interventions during the period 2008 to 2009. Although the scale of 
interventions and their impacts varied across markets, they contributed in various ways to 
stabilize the regional financial system in conditions of stress3. The effectiveness of policy 
rate cut will be revised in the empirical tests. The findings should have several implications 
for bank managers and policy makers for forecasting and stress testing purposes to detect 
problems arising in the banking system.  
Table 1 - Moody’s Average Bank Financial Strength Ratings 
Country Date Average 
Strength 
Ratings 
Outlook changes 
Japan Dec.2008 C- Negative 
Singapore May.2008 B Negative 
HongKong Dec.2007 B Stable. (But according to a HKMA 
publication in 2008, the outlook was 
less promising and uncertain). 
Korea Oct.2008 C- Negative, primarily due to its 
dependence on international capital 
and money markets for funding. 
Thailand Sep.2008 D Negative 
Indonesia Dec.2008 D Stable  
Philippines Feb.2008 D Stable 
Malaysia 2009 C-D  Stable 
Source: Pomerleano (2009) 
The outline of this paper is presented as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical 
framework and empirical evidence of macro-financial linkages and bank behaviour. Section 
3 describes the empirical models, methodologies and data sample. The analysis of the 
empirical results will be discussed in Sect. 4. Section 5 provides conclusions.  
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2. Literature review  
2.1. The theoretical framework of macro-financial linkages and bank behaviour 
The theoretical literature that explains macro-financial linkages and bank behaviour is 
linked to the credit channel via borrower and bank balance sheet effects. The borrower 
balance sheet channel relates to borrowers’ equity position (or net worth, NW), which 
influences their access to credit. This is also known as the financial accelerator effect, 
explaining bank lending behaviour and its relationship with the cyclical fluctuations in the 
economy. The channel works through a so called external finance premium (EFP), the 
wedge reflecting the difference in the cost of externally and internally raised funds 
(Bernanke et al., 1994; Kiyotaki & Moore, 1995). Bernanke et al. (1994) argue for an 
inverse relationship between the borrowers’ NW and EFP. During business upturn, a firm’s 
NW is improved and the greater it is, the lower the EFP, as lenders assume less risk when 
lending to high NW agents. An adverse shock that lowers borrowers’ current cash flows 
leads to a decline in their NW and raises EFP. The increase in borrowers’ cost of financing 
will discourage their desires to undertake more investment projects and consequently 
affect the demand for credit, propagating and amplifying the effect of the initial shocks. 
Kiyotaki and Moore (1995) develop a dynamic equilibrium model to demonstrate that 
borrowers’ NW is not only sensitive to the variation in cash flow, but also the changes in 
the valuation of the real and financial assets they hold. In this model, assets play a dual role 
in an economy: (i) to produce goods and services and (ii) to provide collateral for loans. 
When asset values are hit by a temporary shock, a direct effect occurs because the changes 
in collateral values cause changes in obtained credit. In addition, the reduction in 
production and spending as a result of the shocks to real economies may also depress asset 
prices further, causing shock propagation over time.  
The bank balance sheet channel refers to the traditional bank lending and bank capital 
channels. The traditional bank lending channel focuses on the reserve-deposit constraints 
on the supply of bank loans. However, the traditional bank lending model has largely 
ignored the role of bank capital and endogenous credit risk by assuming that all loans are 
paid back. Holmstrom and Tirole (1997) point out the important role of bank capital to 
finance bank lending because this will provide the incentives for banks to monitor 
borrowers and overcome the moral hazard problem. Therefore, a shrinkage in bank capital 
due to a fall in loan pay-offs following a shock that weakens firms’ NW will reduce the 
volume of loan supply. Blum and Hellwig (1995), Borio et al. (2010) and Goodhart et al. 
(2004) study the bank capital channel in terms of regulatory requirements. Increases in 
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credit risk during recession cause a deterioration in the bank capital ratio and hence banks 
face much higher capital needs to fulfil regulatory requirements. However, raising fresh 
capital is more difficult and costly because banks’ profit and capacity to build up reserves 
diminishes, and they are likely to de-lever their assets and reduce certain types of them. In 
this sense, the amount of credit extended to firms and households will fall, which in turn 
will restrain borrowers’ expenditure and lower aggregate demand.  
2.2.  Empirical evidence for bank behaviour 
There is a general consensus in the empirical literature that bank behaviour is likely to 
vary according to the stage of the business cycle and the bank’s specific characteristics. 
2.2.1. Economic Condition and Pro-cyclical Bank Behaviour 
Extensive research has linked bank credit risk, profitability, capital adequacy and credit 
supply to the overall condition of the economy. A large amount of work has applied macro-
stress testing (Du¨llmann and Erdelmeier 2009; Segoviano Basurto and Padilla 2007; Sorge 
and Virolainen 2006) and VAR framework (Alves 2005; Castre´n et al. 2008; Jacobson et al. 
2005) to analyse the relationships between macroeconomic condition and bank credit risk. 
The empirical results suggest the importance of GDP, inflation, interest rate, and exchange 
rates in determining the variation in NPL, loan loss provision (LLP), and probability of 
defaults (PDs). 
The effect of macro-financial variables on bank profitability is mixed in the empirical 
findings. On one hand, the work of Athanasoglou et al. (2008); Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga 
(1999); and Molyneux and Thornton (1992) shows a significant positive relationship 
between macroeconomic factors (GDP, inflation and policy rate) and bank profitability. On 
the other hand, some studies find little direct significant relationship. However, credit 
quality is one of the key drivers of a bank’s profits, hence when macro-financial conditions 
weaken a bank’s credit quality by increasing NPL and LLP, this also indirectly affects its 
profits (Davydenko, 2010; Pangestu, 2003; Vong & Chan, 2009). 
In terms of bank capital, the empirical studies focus on the procyclical feature of capital 
requirements in partial adjustment models. Ayuso et al. (2004), Lindquist (2004), Stolz and 
Wedow (2005) and Jokipii and Milne (2008) examine the relationship between capital 
ratios and various measures of the business cycle such as real GDP growth and the real 
output gap. Their findings show that this relationship is statistically significant and 
negative, which suggests that banks raise capital during downturns as a buffer to negative 
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shocks. However, the main concern of cyclical influences is the banks’ inability to raise 
capital during economic contractions; they therefore try to reduce lending.   
Credit supply response is also sensitive to business cycle phases because the state of the 
economy affects the ability of bank managers to predict returns from lending 
opportunities. If banks perceive a stable macro environment, they may expect a higher 
probability that borrowers will pay back loans. Therefore, banks adjust their lending in 
response to these expectations, both in terms of stability and level of economic 
performance (Somoye & Ilo, 2009). Talavera et al. (2006) also mention that banks decrease 
their supply of credit when the volatility of macroeconomic variables increases. 
Macroeconomic volatility is captured by the conditional variance of monetary aggregates, 
CPI and the production price index. A related strand of empirical literature on bank lending 
to EMEs during global financial crises confirms the hypothesis of contraction in bank credit 
expansion in recession and general economic uncertainty following external financial 
shock (Aisen & Franken, 2010; Guo & Stepanyan, 2011; Ivashina & Scharfstein, 2010).   
2.2.2. Bank-Specific Characteristics 
While macroeconomic factors are considered as exogenous forces driving bank 
performance, the distinctive features of each particular bank are expected to exert a 
decisive influence on their behaviour. The empirical papers have provided considerable 
evidence to support the following hypotheses relating to bank-specific characteristics: 
Asset size effect hypothesis: Bank size may affect bank behaviour for a variety of reasons 
such as economies of scale, diversification benefits, accessibility to capital and systematic 
effect (too big to fail). In the presence of economies of scale, larger banks benefit from 
lower costs and can undertake more screening and monitoring. This helps banks to reduce 
unexpected losses arising from asymmetric information between lenders and borrowers. 
Larger banks may also have better investment and diversification opportunities, as well as 
more access to capital markets and are therefore subject to a lower probability of negative 
capital shock. During financial stress, big banks may benefit from government protection 
due to systematic effects. In general, bank size is shown to yield a positive effect on asset 
quality (Louzis et al., 2012) and profitability (Demirgüç-Kunt & Huizinga, 1999; Goddard et 
al., 2011). However, bank size may also negatively affect capital management, which means 
that larger banks hold less capital buffer (Alfon et al., 2005; Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Stolz & 
Wedow, 2005).    
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Moral hazard hypothesis: The moral hazard hypothesis refers to the relationship 
between capital and risk-taking. Accordingly, banks with relatively low capital have more 
incentives to increase the riskiness of their portfolio in the form of excess lending, which 
results in a higher NPL in the future. On the contrary, a higher level of capital reduces risk-
taking, which in turn reduces credit risk (Furlong & Keeley, 1989). Berger and DeYoung 
(1997) study the causality between loan quality and capital in US banks and confirm the 
significant moral hazard incentives, suggesting an increase in the level of NPL for poorly-
capitalised banks. In complete contrast, Shrieves and Dahl (1992), Hellmann et al. (2000), 
and Stolz and Wedow (2005) argue that there is a positive relationship between portfolio 
risk and regulatory capital since banks raise capital to keep up their buffer when portfolio 
risk rises. Although the empirical evidence on the risk-capital relationship is inconclusive, 
these findings generally indicate that assets, asset risk and capital are endogenously 
determined. 
Inefficiency hypothesis: The inefficiency hypothesis mentions the effect of bank cost 
management on asset quality and profitability. Berger and DeYoung (1997) and Louzis et 
al. (2012) provide evidence of a significant positive relationship between cost management 
and NPL ratio, which confirms that bad management goes hand in hand with poor skills in 
screening and monitoring borrowers. In terms of profitability, there is a consensus from 
the literature to confirm that cost inefficiency has a negative effect on bank profitability, 
since banks pass a part of the increased costs on to customers and the remaining part 
reduces profits (Athanasoglou et al., 2008; Pasiouras & Kosmidou, 2007).   
Credit risk effect hypothesis: Credit risk is the main source of risk in banking and may 
simultaneously affect many aspects of bank performance. According to Athanasoglou et al. 
(2008), the relationship between credit risk and bank profitability is negative due to the 
fact that poor quality of loans reduces interest revenue. However, Flamini et al. (2009) find 
a positive and significant effect of credit risk on profitability, which may suggest that risk-
averse shareholders target risk-adjusted returns and seek larger earnings to compensate 
for higher credit risk. Credit risk may also either directly or indirectly impact loan supply 
by its influence on profitability and capital. In Berger and Udell (2004), banks tend to 
tighten credit standards in response to deterioration in credit quality. Dumičić and Ridžak 
(2012) add more evidence for the negative relationship between loan quality and earnings, 
capitalisation and loan supply in their study of Croatian banks during the global financial 
crisis. Their findings indicate that a rise in NPL will increase the future costs of banks, and 
consequently diminish credit supply. Nevertheless, Peek and Rosengren (2000) find 
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contradictory behaviour amongst Japanese banks, who have incentives to roll over loans 
for severely impaired firms to limit the growth of bad loans, although this loan extension 
behaviour may create additional losses.  
Earning effect hypothesis: As one of the key components representing financial 
soundness in the CAMEL system, earnings play an important role in banks’ financial 
decisions. The theoretical and empirical literature suggests that changes in profit have a 
positive effect on bank capital. Since raising capital through capital markets is costly, 
retained earnings are frequently used to increase capital (Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Myers, 
1984; Rime, 2001; Schaeck & Cihak, 2012). However, the negative effect of ROA on bank 
capital is also significant in Stolz and Wedow (2005). These authors suggest that highly 
profitable banks are able to permanently generate high profits and retain earnings to 
increase capital; they therefore need to hold a lower level of capital buffers as insurance 
against a probable violation of the regulatory minimum.   
In conclusion, the literature survey of macro-financial linkages and bank behaviour reveals 
some gaps that motivate the development of the empirical strategy of this research. First, 
the existing literature focuses on investigating each aspect of bank behaviour (i.e. asset 
quality, profitability, capital buffer or lending behaviour) separately. Study of the 
simultaneous adjustment of all four of these dimensions of bank performance appears to be 
very limited. Furthermore, although the empirical evidence mostly shows the relationships 
between bank-specific characteristics in pairs, the literature suggests that specific 
behavioural factors are endogenously determined. Second, the empirical research 
measures bank behaviour which is mostly determined by macroeconomic variables and 
bank-specific characteristics. It seems to ignore the effects of common global shocks. 
Regarding the studies of shock transmission across countries, the main focus is on asset 
price and capital flow channels with less attention paid to microeconomic conditions and 
institutional factors. Last, in accordance with the study on one specific dimension of bank 
performance, current research tend to apply a single-equation framework and the most 
common econometric techniques are the VAR model and/or fixed effect regression in panel 
data. However, the fixed effects may encounter dynamic panel bias and fail to capture 
reverse causality. These problems have been addressed in some empirical works using 
instrumental variables estimation (e.g. 2SLS), but 2SLS is only efficient under 
homoscedasticity (Roodman, 2009). This study attempts to bridge the literature gaps by 
examining the simultaneous adjustment in asset quality, profitability, capital adequacy and 
lending behaviour, in response to the changes in the macro-financial environment and 
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global shocks. The partial adjustment models and two-step system GMM estimation are 
applied to deal with dynamic panel data, fixed effects, endogeneity, omitted variables and 
persistent series. 
3. Methodologies and Data Sample  
3.1. Methodologies 
Bank behaviour is examined using partial adjustment model, which has the following 
specifications:  
𝒀𝒕 − 𝒀𝒕−𝟏 =  𝜷(𝒀𝒕
∗ − 𝒀𝒕−𝟏)       (1) 
𝒀𝒕
∗ = ∑ 𝜶𝒌𝑿𝒌𝒕
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏 + 𝝁𝒕  (2) 
where 𝑌𝑡 represents the proxy variables for bank performance at time t;  
𝑌𝑡
∗ is an optimal target level, hence, in the long run 𝑌𝑡 will tend to converge toward 𝑌𝑡
∗. The 
optimal target level is not readily observable, but it depends on a set of internal and 
external factors, denoted by Xkt;  
𝛽 measures the speed of adjustment  and lies between 0 and 1. The closer it approaches to 
1, the faster the speed of adjustment; 
𝜇𝑡 is an error term.  
Combining (1) and (2) give the following model: 
𝒀𝒕 = (𝟏 − 𝜷)𝒀𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜷𝒀𝒕 
∗ = (𝟏 − 𝜷)𝒀𝒕−𝟏+ ∑ 𝜷𝜶𝒌𝑿𝒌𝒕
𝑲
𝒌=𝟏 +  𝝁𝒕    (3) 
Equation (3) implies that bank behaviour is a function of the dynamic partial adjustment 
process and the desired target level, which may depend on the state of the economy and a 
bank’s financial situation. Four dimensions of bank behaviour are proxied with the 
following variables: (i) the ratio of NPL over gross loan (denoted by NPL) to measure asset 
quality (also credit risk), (ii) return on assets (ROA) to represent bank profitability, (iii) 
capital adequacy ratio (CAR), which is measured by the amount of a bank’s core capital as a 
percentage of its risk-weighted assets, (iv) lending behaviour is proxied by the percentage 
difference in total gross loan to non-bank customers (LOAN). The vector of explanatory 
variables, Xkt includes macroeconomic factors (ME), financial market variables (FM), global 
stress indices (GF) and bank-specific variables (Z). Applying the partial adjustment model 
for each dimension of bank behaviour, the four equations are set up as follows:   
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𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕 = 𝜸𝟏𝑵𝑷𝑳𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟏𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟏𝑭𝑴𝒊𝒕 + 𝝋𝟏𝑮𝑭𝒕 + 𝝅𝟏𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝟏,𝒊𝒕  (4) 
𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕 = 𝜸𝟐𝑹𝑶𝑨𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟐𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟐𝑭𝑴𝒊𝒕 + 𝝋𝟐𝑮𝑭𝒕 + 𝝅𝟐𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝟐,𝒊𝒕  (5) 
𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕 = 𝜸𝟑𝑪𝑨𝑹𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟑𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟑𝑭𝑴𝒊𝒕 + 𝝋𝟑𝑮𝑭𝒕 + 𝝅𝟑𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝟑,𝒊𝒕  (6) 
𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝒊𝒕 = 𝜸𝟒𝑳𝑶𝑨𝑵𝒊𝒕−𝟏 + 𝜹𝟒𝑴𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜽𝟒𝑭𝑴𝒊𝒕 + 𝝋𝟒𝑮𝑭𝒕 + 𝝅𝟒𝒁𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝟒,𝒊𝒕  (7) 
where: 𝑖 = {1,2, … , 𝑁} refers to individual bank i; 
𝜀𝑖𝑡 = 𝜔𝑖 + 𝜗𝑖𝑡,  with 𝜔𝑖 the unobservable bank-specific effects and 𝜗𝑖𝑡  the idiosyncratic 
error, given 𝜔𝑖~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜔
2 ) and 𝜗𝑖𝑡~𝐼𝐼𝐷(0, 𝜎𝜗
2), independent of each other and among 
themselves. 
The estimated parameter 𝛾 helps identify the adjustment factor 𝛽 in the partial adjustment 
model as 𝛾 = 1 − 𝛽 ⇒  𝛽 = 1 − 𝛾. All explanatory variables enter the estimation of 
equations 4 - 7 with the current lags based on the assumption that banks revised their 
targets during the estimation period.  
Equations 4, 5, 6 and 7 are estimated using dynamic panel data techniques with system-
GMM as proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) and Blundell and Bond (1998). GMM is 
more relevant for this study given that the structure of the data panel has a limited number 
of years (t = 10) and a substantial number of cross-sectional observations (n = 196). 
Moreover, bank-specific characteristic variables are likely to be potentially endogenous 
(Athanasoglou et al., 2008) and some other independent variables are not strictly 
exogenous, which make the application of other econometric methodologies (OLS, fixed 
effects, 2SLS) inappropriate. GMM estimation allows for instrumenting of the endogenous 
variables and provides consistent estimates. It is also robust to the omitted variables 
problem and helps avoid bias, when the presence of the lagged dependent variable with 
fixed effects gives rise to autocorrelation (Nickell, 1981). The GMM estimation of Arellano 
and Bond (1991) is based on the first difference transformation in the initial equation to 
eliminate the specific-effect component. The lags of the right hand side variables in the 
equations are used as instruments.  
However, according to Blundell and Bond (1998), first-differences estimation has a large 
bias and low precision in a short sample period and relatively persistent data. This is 
clearly a concern in the studies of bank behaviour, since some of the variables (e.g. bank 
assets), display high levels of persistency, even after controlling for time trends. Therefore, 
this paper applies system GMM, derived from the jointly estimated system of two 
simultaneous equations in both levels (with lagged first differences as instruments) and in 
 11 
first differences (with lagged levels as instruments). The two-step estimation is used 
because is it asymptotically more efficient than the one-step estimator in the presence of 
heteroskedasticity and serial correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991; Blundell & Bond, 1998). 
However, the two-step estimator imposes a severe downward bias in standard errors. 
Following Windmeijer (2005), finite sample correction to two-step covariance matrix is 
employed (Windmeijer-corrected cluster–robust errors). The Hansen J-test is performed to 
test the validity of instrument sets and the Arellano–Bond test is applied to check the 
absence of second-order serial correlation in the first differenced residuals.  
3.2. Descriptions of Variables and Data Sources 
Models are estimated on an annual panel dataset of 196 commercial banks in eight East 
Asian countries (Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia, Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, Hong Kong 
and Japan)4 from 2005 to 2014. Banks are selected based on country location categories 
from Bankscope database. The process starts with all local banks that have observations 
available within the investigated time period and then banks with insufficient performance 
data are dropped from the sample. Not all banks enter the sample in every year, so the 
selection process results in an unbalanced panel. The set of macroeconomic, financial, 
global stress variables and bank-specific characteristics is decided based on the literature 
and the narrative of the crisis.   
Macroeconomic variables: the macroeconomic variables consist of the real GDP annual 
growth rate (GDP); inflation calculated as the average change in the CPI (INF); and change 
in policy rate (ΔPR). The hypothesis is that banks respond significantly to changes in the 
macroeconomic condition. Specifically, a decline in GDP (as a consequence of the contagion 
effect from global shock) negatively affects borrowers’ cash flows and reduces their loan 
payoff probabilities. As a result, banks may suffer increasing problems in outstanding loans 
and declining profits. The downward adjustments in loan portfolio quality and profitability 
will weaken bank capital and reduce credit supply via balance sheet effects. At the same 
time, the economic slowdown also directly affects lending behaviour because it makes 
information in the financial markets even more asymmetric and worsens the adverse 
selection problem (Mishkin, 1999). The effects of inflation and interest rates are 
challenging. In theory, increases in interest rates and unanticipated declines in inflation 
cause firms’ NW to decrease with negative implications for the banking sector (Bernanke et 
                                                          
4 The paper focuses on six ASEAN countries which were strongly affected by the 1997-1998 financial crisis and two 
financial centres of the region (Hong Kong and Japan) as they have played a very important role in the credit market 
of Asia.  
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al., 1994; Mishkin, 1999). However, in EMEs inflation is usually very high and variable; 
therefore an unanticipated decline in inflation will be more likely to have a favourable 
effect on firms’ balance sheets. ΔPR variable is added in the model not only to control for 
central bank interventions to sustain contagion effect during the global financial crisis, but 
also to capture the effect of the traditional bank lending channel. 
Table 2– Summary of explanatory variables 
Categories 
Variables description 
Mnemonic Definition 
Macroeconomic 
variables 
GDP  Real GDP annual growth rate  
(IMF-IFS)   INF Inflation, average consumer price (percentage change) 
  
ΔPR 
Changes in central bank policy rates to represent policy 
intervention (or changes in 3-months interbank rates for 
Vietnam due to data limitation) 
Financial 
market 
variables 
SVOL 
Stock market volatility calculated by the standard 
deviation of daily returns on market index 
(Datastream) 
FER 
Return on nominal foreign exchange rate (local currency 
per US dollar)  
  
CRISK 
Sovereign CDS spreads expressed by basis point (in 
logarithm)  
Global 
variables 
VIX 
Change in Chicago Board Options Exchange S&P500 
Volatility Index  
(Datastream) TED 
Spreads between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month US 
Treasury bill rate 
Bank-level 
variables 
TA Logarithm of bank’s total assets (in million USD) 
(Bankscope) LTD Ratio between customer loan to deposit 
  
NPL Non-performing loan to gross loan  
  CAR 
Capital adequacy ratio, measured by the amount of 
bank’s core capital as a percentage of its risk-weighted 
assets.  
  ROA Net income after tax to average assets 
  
LOAN 
Percentage change in gross loan provided to non-bank 
sectors 
 
Financial market variables: In order to represent the financial market perception, three 
variables are employed: volatilities of stock returns (SVOL); returns on nominal exchange 
rates (FER); and sovereign Credit Default Swap Spreads (CDS). Empirical studies strongly 
support the hypothesis that asset prices become highly correlated during a crisis via 
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deleveraging effects. After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, global 
investors dramatically reduced their exposures to East Asia, resulting in sharp declines in 
many stock markets. An adverse adjustment in stock prices could dampen consumer 
spending through a negative wealth effect. Moreover, stock price devaluation promotes 
financial instability because it leads to a large decline in the market value of firms’ NW 
(Calomiris & Hubbard, 1990; Mishkin, 1999). Changes in CDS may affect the default risk of 
banks because financial institutions often hold a significant share of sovereign debt in total 
assets. Unanticipated exchange rate depreciation also contributes to financial instability as 
it makes domestic borrowers unable to roll over foreign currency liabilities and causes a 
mismatch in the banks’ value of foreign denominated assets and liabilities (Mishkin, 1999).   
Global financial stress variables: The effect of the global financial crisis is examined with 
the S&P500 volatility index (VIX) and TED spreads (TED). VIX is a key measure of a 
market’s expectation of short-term (up to 30 days) volatility, and has therefore been 
considered as the world’s premier barometer of investor sentiment. TED is widely used as 
an indicator to measure liquidity and credit risk, since the interbank rate represents banks’ 
perception of the creditworthiness of other financial institutions and the availability of 
funds for lending purposes, compared with risk free investment in government securities.  
Table 3 – Descriptive statistics of variables 
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev. Min Max 
NPL 1965 3.494 3.043 0.000 39.589 
ROA 2019 0.695 0.840 -6.338 5.319 
CAR 1932 14.454 5.415 0.780 63.500 
LOAN 1997 4.295 18.323 -59.4 408.39 
LTD 2021 65.982 34.739 0.399 463.960 
TA 2025 16.243 2.311 7.636 21.668 
GDP 2030 2.557 3.232 -5.520 15.240 
INF 2030 2.213 2.990 -1.340 13.100 
ΔPR 2030 -0.034 0.951 -3.170 4.120 
SVOL 2030 21.134 9.468 7.217 113.708 
FER 2030 0.175 7.618 -13.361 20.138 
CDS 1958 102.912 100.451 3.758 375.562 
VIX 2030 -0.130 6.293 -8.930 15.128 
TED 2030 0.515 0.405 0.200 1.550 
 
Bank-specific variables: Bank-specific variables involve: TA (logarithm of a bank’s total 
assets) to control for the asset size effect; LTD (customer loan to deposit ratio) to capture 
bank liquidity and the relative dependence on wholesale funding; CAR to control for the 
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moral hazard effect; NPL to control for credit risk; ROA to control for the earning effect; 
and LOAN to control for risk-taking behaviour.  
Table 4 - Correlation matrix of variables 
  NPL ROA CAR LOAN LTD TA GDP 
NPL 1.000 
      ROA -0.059 1.000 
     CAR -0.030 0.516 1.000 
    LOAN -0.144 -0.302 -0.369 1.000 
   LTD 0.049 0.232 0.105 -0.271 1.000 
  TA -0.143 -0.293 -0.321 0.989 -0.338 1.000 
 GDP 0.057 0.546 0.350 -0.392 0.210 -0.383 1.000 
INF 0.097 0.556 0.428 -0.384 0.189 -0.380 0.570 
ΔPR 0.053 0.013 0.020 -0.048 0.066 -0.054 0.107 
SVOL -0.044 -0.171 -0.045 0.226 -0.119 0.226 -0.289 
FER -0.112 0.069 0.014 0.026 -0.059 0.025 0.043 
CDS 0.007 0.315 0.355 -0.234 -0.151 -0.219 0.202 
VIX 0.029 -0.129 -0.038 -0.036 0.000 -0.039 -0.189 
TED 0.069 -0.138 -0.040 -0.055 -0.009 -0.058 -0.120 
  INF ΔPR SVOL FER CDS VIX TED 
INF 1.000 
      ΔPR 0.213 1.000 
     SVOL 0.072 -0.114 1.000 
    FER 0.089 0.094 -0.143 1.000 
   CDS 0.475 -0.096 0.117 -0.005 1.000 
  VIX 0.195 0.036 0.591 -0.165 -0.065 1.000 
 TED 0.130 -0.043 0.626 -0.285 -0.068 0.883 1.000 
 
The macro data come from IMF – IFS, financial market and global financial stress data are 
collected from Datastream and bank-level data are extracted from BankScope. The 
description of variables is provided in Table 2, while Table 3 summarises descriptive 
statistics, which show marked performance differences between the banks in the sample. 
On average, the NPL ratio between 2005 and 2014 is 3.5%, which is quite low compared 
with the peak in the 1997 Asian crisis. Banks’ regulatory capital also varies considerably 
but average CAR is relatively high, well above the Basel III requirement. In terms of 
profitability, the mean of ROA is reported at 0.69%, which is quite small because some 
banks experienced losses with negative ROA and the highest ratio is 5.32%. There is also 
quite wide heterogeneity between banks in terms of their size, liquidity and credit growth. 
The statistics on macro-financial variables also evidence large dispersion both across 
countries and over time. The variation in VIX and TED indicates the collapse of the risk 
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appetite of international investors and the global liquidity shortage, causing contagion 
effects in Asia. Table 4 shows the correlation coefficients between variables which are 
relatively low. Therefore, there may be no problem to involve them all in the regressions.  
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The estimation results are reported in Tables 5, 6, 7 and 8, representing different 
dimensions of bank performance. Various specifications of Eqs. 4, 5, 6 and 7 are examined. 
Specification 1 shows estimated parameters of bank behaviour, which is subject to 
macroeconomic factors and bank-specific characteristics suggested by the literature. 
Financial market variables were added to specification 2 and the global financial stress 
indicators as well as policy intervention were then included to capture the vulnerability of 
East Asian banks to external shocks in specification 3 and 4. The macro-financial variables 
are treated as strictly exogenous, while bank-specific variables are considered to be 
endogenous, in the sense that each behavioural factor can simultaneously cause the 
responses of the others. The estimated models fit the panel data reasonably well. The 
Wald-test statistics reject the null hypothesis of jointly insignificant parameters. The 
Hansen test for over-identifying restrictions confirms that the structural specifications are 
well modeled as the null hypothesis of valid instruments cannot be rejected. The p-values 
associated with AR(1) and AR(2) clearly indicate that the moment conditions of the models 
meet the requirements. Specifically, the tests reject the null hypothesis of zero first order 
serial correlation but cannot reject the absence of second order autocorrelated errors. In all 
regressions, the lags of dependent variables are statistically significant at a level of 1%, 
which confirms the persistent nature of bank performance and justifies the selection of 
dynamic models and system GMM. The estimated coefficients of lagged dependent 
variables give the speed of adjustment to a target value which is medium (β is around 0.25 
- 0.6) for asset quality, capital and lending but relatively faster for bank profitability. In all 
models, most of the macroeconomic and financial variables have statistically significant 
effects on bank behaviour. Generally, the empirical results seem to be fairly robust, 
although the significance and size of a few coefficients may vary in different specifications.  
4.1. Asset Quality 
Table 5 shows that most external factors influence bank’s asset quality. NPL is statistically 
and negatively affected by economic growth, which sharpens the cyclical nature of banks’ 
behavior. Higher than expected NPL ratios in downturns are associated with declines in 
borrowers’ cash flows and NW, which lower their debt servicing capacity. The effect of 
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inflation is not consistent in all specifications. The positive coefficients of INF in (1) and (2) 
suggest that increases in inflation will deteriorate firms’ wealth and raise banks’ credit risk. 
However, the effect of inflation will reverse in the presence of interest rate. The 
deterioration in financial market perceptions represented by increased sovereign risk and 
stock volatility as well as local currency depreciation also signals an increase in NPL. Local 
currency depreciation lowers the debt-servicing capacity of export-oriented firms which 
borrow in foreign currencies. Increase in sovereign credit risk and market volatility signal 
economic uncertainties, which have negative implications for banks’ risks and expected 
losses. The global factors of VIX and TED demonstrated significant and positive influences 
on domestic banks’ asset quality, which indicates the transfer of credit risk and contagion 
effect. The positive coefficient of ΔPR appears to be consistent with theoretical consensus 
that increasing interest rates increase debt burdens for borrowers and reduce debt pay-off 
probability.   
There are also significant connections between NPL and the bank-specific characteristics. 
The negative coefficient of ROA supports the cost efficiency hypothesis. Better managed 
banks tend to have better asset quality. The change in gross loans also affects NPL at a level 
of significance of 1%. The negative impact of credit growth and loan to deposit ratio on NPL 
implies the instantaneous effect of increases in gross loans, which lowers the ratio of NPL 
(provisionally) within that period. There is evidence to support the size effect, verified by 
significant coefficients on TA. The positive coefficient of CAR is consistent with Hellmann et 
al. (2000) and Stolz and Wedow (2005) who explained that bank raised capital to keep up 
their buffer when portfolio risk risen. This implies the conservative attitudes of Asian 
banks after a decade of crisis resolution.  
4.2. Bank Profitability 
Bank profitability shows a lower level of persistence comparing to those of NPL, CAR and 
LOAN; implying that its convergence toward equilibrium level is relatively rapid. One of the 
reasons could be the increasing intensity of competition in the banking industry as a result 
of financial integration in East Asia. Banks profits appear to be very sensitive to the state of 
the economy and the perception of the financial market. The positive effects of GDP are 
consistent with much of the previous empirical literature, confirming that bank profits 
improve in good economic conditions because there is higher demand for credit, as well as 
non-credit services, and there is less credit risk. There is also significant positive impact of 
inflation on profitability, suggesting that inflation in Asian countries was well managed and 
anticipated during the period, so the banks adjusted the profit rates accordingly (Trujillo‐
 17 
Ponce, 2013). Financial market performance has conflicting effects on ROA. The  coefficient 
on  FER  variable  is  positive  and  significant  which  seems  to  contradict  to  the 
hypothesis  that  local  currency  depreciation  signals  financial  instability that  may  
increase  credit  risk  and  deteriorate  bank  income. One  possible explanation for this 
result is that a small depreciation may improve the cash flows of  export-oriented  firms  
with  a  positive  implication  for  bank  profitability. The positive effect of market volatility 
and CDS spreads on banks’ profit is also surprising. However, according to Lahmann 
(2012), there was contagion effect between sovereign and bank default risk in Asia-Pacific 
during the period of global financial crisis. Then, the co-movement of the perceived risk in 
bank sector and profits may imply the risk-return hypothesis. The global variables (VIX and 
TED), have a significant and negative impact on ROA, demonstrating that funding shortages 
together with the corruption of international investors’ risk appetite, may cause the 
contraction of cross-border banking flows and increase tension in the interbank market. 
This will lead to impaired access to funding and a drop in trading volumes.  
The effects of bank-specific characteristics support the credit risk hypothesis. Rising NPL 
negatively relates to bank profitability, which means that a poor quality of loans reduces 
interest revenue and increases provisioning cost. This suggests the important implication 
that in order to maximise profits, banks should improve the screening and monitoring of 
the risk of loan default (Karminsky & Kostrov, 2014). Moreover, well-capitalized banks 
were more likely to earn higher profits as they were able to attract more customers and 
extend their services, supported by the positive coefficients on CAR.   
4.3. Capital Adequacy 
The estimated parameters suggest a dynamic structure for bank capital in which today’s 
capital adequacy ratio adjusts to the previous period’s level. The significant and negative 
coefficients on GDP suggest the counter-cyclical effects, i.e. banks increase their capital 
holdings during economic downturn to accommodate higher risks (Ayuso et al., 2004; 
Jokipii & Milne, 2008; Stolz & Wedow, 2005). There is also convincing evidence to support 
the hypothesis that financial volatility has a significant impact on the capital ratio. As 
raising capital during the financial turbulence is difficult and costly, banks tend to hold 
more capital buffer. This lagged effect of VIX and TED is also more likely to reflect bank 
attitude toward the perceived risk. However, if the shock persisted, that may deteriorate 
banks’ asset quality and profitability with negative implication for bank capital.  
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Bank capital is also highly dependent on bank-specific characteristics. Coefficients on NPL, 
ROA, LOAN and TA are all significant at the level of either 1%. The findings support the 
results from Alfon et al. (2005), in that banks decide the level of capital according to 
internal risk assessment. The negative coefficient on NPL is consistent with the theory of 
bank capital channel, while the negative coefficient on LOAN indicates that the increase in 
risky assets will contemporaneously weaken capital ratios. ROA also shows a statistically 
significant and positive effect, implying that profitable banks prefer to retain their earnings 
to improve their capitalisation. The significantly negative coefficient of TA supports the 
asset size effect hypothesis. Larger banks may have better diversification opportunities and 
easier access to capital markets, therefore they tend to hold less capital as a buffer against 
negative capital shocks.  
4.4. Lending Behaviour 
The empirical results show that the lagged dependent variable has a positive sign and is 
statistically significant in all specifications, giving an adjustment parameter of around 0.26. 
Overall, the rate at which banks adjusts their lending depends significantly on GDP growth, 
stock volatility, foreign exchange rates, country risk, global financial stress and changes in 
their specific performance. First, a positive coefficient on GDP affirms the pro-cyclical 
nature of lending behaviour. Specifically, during an economic upturn, firms’ cash flows are 
improved and banks have an incentive to extend credit to borrowers. On the contrary, a 
recessionary period not only increases the default risk but also lowers loan demand. 
Turning to financial variables, market volatility and currency devaluation is likely to 
increase the perceived level of uncertainty about firms’ future cash flows. This discourages 
banks from extending credit. At the same time, increasing global investors’ risk aversion 
(high VIX and TED indices) had negative aggregate effects of bank lending. Moreover, TED 
spreads is also a measure of global funding shock. The estimation results suggest that 
facing with global liquidity shortage; international banks tend to stop rolling over their 
lending to the region. In the presence of informational asymmetry, domestic banks cannot 
perfectly substitute wholesale funding with domestic deposits. Therefore, a sudden stop in 
cross-border funding will propagate shock through the same transmission mechanism as 
stated in the literature on bank lending channels (Bernanke and Blinder, 1989; Bernanke 
and Gertler, 1995; Kashyap and Stein, 2000). This finding once again cautions East Asian 
bank vulnerabilities to international liquidity and capital flow cycles. The positive 
coefficient on PR appears to be inconsistent with the hypothesis about the effectiveness of 
policy rate cut to boost bank lending. One possible explanation is that a decrease in interest 
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rates with a negative effect on the supply side of loans may have offset its positive effects 
on lending volumes. 
In all specifications, we find that credit growth is driven by bank soundness, as sounder 
banks have more capacity to manage risks and to expand faster than others. First, 
improved asset quality has a significant impact on the issuance of more private credit to 
businesses. On the contrary, increasing NPL in a downturn, coupled with a decline in the 
value of collaterals, engenders greater caution among banks and leads to a tightening of 
credit extension. Moreover, high NPL also has negative implications for banks’ capital and 
limits their access to financing. Second, credit tends to grow faster in highly profitable 
banks, as verified by the positive coefficient on ROA. This may be because more profitable 
banks have fewer constraints and are less risk averse, and are therefore more likely to 
expand their loan portfolio. Third, bank capitalisation significantly influences the reaction 
of credit supply to macro-financial shocks; however, this result is likely to support banks’ 
attitude toward risk rather than the bank capital channel. A negative effect of the CAR on 
LOAN indicates that well-capitalised banks are more risk-averse because they want to limit 
the probability of not meeting capital requirements (Dewatripont & Tirole, 1994).  
Table 5 – System GMM Estimation of Asset Quality 
Dependent variable: NPL (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.NPL 0.451* 0.474* 0.478* 0.478* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Macroeconomic variables 
    
GDP -0.010* -0.036* -0.036* -0.037* 
 
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
INF 0.055* 0.014* -0.083* -0.081* 
 
(0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
PR 
  
0.252* 0.251* 
   
(0.003) (0.003) 
Financial market variables 
   
SVOL 
 
0.009* 
 
                
  
(0.000) 
 
                
FER 
 
0.005* 0.003* 0.003* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CRISK 
 
0.343* 0.343* 0.342* 
  
(0.007) (0.008) (0.009) 
Global factors 
    
VIX 
  
0.004*                 
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(0.001)                 
L.VIX 
  
0.008*                 
   
(0.000)                 
TED 
   
0.085* 
    
(0.011) 
L.TED 
   
0.170* 
    
(0.009) 
Bank-specific characteristics 
   
ROA -0.757* -0.749* -0.728* -0.729* 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
CAR 0.031* 0.017* 0.017* 0.017* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
LOAN -0.014* -0.012* -0.012* -0.012* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
TA 0.077* 0.119* 0.047* 0.045* 
 
(0.004) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003) 
LTD -0.001* -0.001* -0.002* -0.002* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
CONS. -0.307* -2.609* -0.574* -0.746* 
 
(0.076) (0.091) (0.103) (0.095) 
No. of Obs. 1,666 1,624 1,624 1,624 
Banks (cross sections) 196 196 196 196 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.422 0.474 0.529 0.561 
AR(1) 0.026 0.029 0.030 0.030 
AR(2) 0.727 0.812 0.797 0.799 
Notes: * represent statistical significance at level of 1%.  Standard errors in parentheses. Global factors of VIX 
at current and lag levels were included in (3) and of TED were included in (4) to check the robustness of 
results.  SVOL variable was dropped from specification (3) & (4) to avoid multicollinearity problem as it was 
highly correlated with VIX & TED. 
 
Table 6 – System GMM Estimation of Bank Profitability 
Dependent variable: ROA (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.ROA 0.154* 0.158* 0.155* 0.155* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Macroeconomic variables 
    GDP 0.007* 0.002* 0.003* 0.003* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
INF 0.010* 0.006* 0.008* 0.009* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
PR 
  
-0.007* -0.007* 
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(0.001) (0.001)    
Financial market variables 
   SVOL 
 
0.002* 
 
                
  
(0.000) 
 
                
FER 
 
0.004* 0.004* 0.004* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CRISK 
 
0.018* 0.033* 0.031* 
  
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
-0.020*                 
   
(0.000)                 
L.VIX 
  
-0.004*                 
   
(0.000)                 
TED 
   
-0.200* 
    
(0.003)    
L.TED 
   
0.148* 
    
(0.003)    
Bank-specific characteristics 
   NPL -0.060* -0.058* -0.056* -0.056* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CAR 0.035* 0.032* 0.032* 0.032* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
LOAN -0.000* -0.000* -0.000* -0.000    
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
TA 0.111* 0.099* 0.096* 0.095* 
 
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
LTD 0.063* 0.094* 0.092* 0.093* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
CONS. -1.885* -1.862* -1.492* -1.637* 
 
(0.038) (0.038) (0.078) (0.079)    
No. of Obs. 1,682 1,656 1,656 1,656 
Banks (cross sections) 196 196 196 196 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.326 0.340 0.375 0.374 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.153 0.103 0.105 0.106 
Notes: * represent statistical significance at level of 1%.  Standard errors in parentheses. Global factors of VIX 
at current and lag levels were included in (3) and of TED were included in (4) to check the robustness of 
results.  SVOL variable was dropped from specification (3) & (4) to avoid multicollinearity problem as it was 
highly correlated with VIX & TED. 
 
Table 7 – System GMM Estimation of Capital Adequacy 
Dependent variable: CAR (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.CAR 0.517* 0.534* 0.536* 0.535* 
 
(0.001) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
Macroeconomic variables 
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GDP -0.096* -0.034** -0.037* -0.035* 
 
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    
INF 0.052* -0.011* -0.009** -0.010* 
 
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004)    
PR 
  
0.044* 0.046* 
   
(0.006) (0.006)    
Financial market variables 
   SVOL 
 
0.006* 
 
                
  
(0.001) 
 
                
FER 
 
-0.010* -0.010* -0.010* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CRISK 
 
0.478* 0.446* 0.450* 
  
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013)    
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
-0.026*                 
   
(0.001)                 
L.VIX 
  
0.021*                 
   
(0.001)                 
TED 
   
-0.476* 
    
(0.012)    
L.TED 
   
0.247* 
    
(0.012)    
Bank-specific characteristics 
   NPL 0.002 -0.013* -0.013* -0.014* 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)    
ROA 1.065* 1.004* 0.994* 0.998* 
 
(0.008) (0.010) (0.008) (0.008)    
LOAN -0.041* -0.049* -0.049* -0.049* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
TA -0.642* -0.418* -0.422* -0.419* 
 
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)    
LTD 0.004* 0.006* 0.006* 0.006* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CONS. 19.034* 11.856* 12.785* 12.944* 
 
(0.121) (0.164) (0.139) (0.142)    
No. of Obs. 1,676 1,651 1,651 1,651 
Banks (cross sections) 196 196 196 196 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.394 0.376 0.497 0.501 
AR(1) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.210 0.294 0.284 0.284 
Notes:  *, ** represent statistical significance at levels of 1% and 5%.  Standard errors in parentheses. Global 
factors of VIX at current and lag levels were included in (3) and of TED were included in (4) to check the 
robustness of results.  SVOL variable was dropped from specification (3) & (4) to avoid multicollinearity 
problem as it was highly correlated with VIX & TED. 
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Table 8 – System GMM Estimation of Credit Growth 
Dependent variable: LOAN (1) (2) (3) (4) 
L.LOAN 0.714* 0.738* 0.740* 0.740* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
Macroeconomic variables 
    GDP 0.004* 0.011* 0.011* 0.012* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
INF 0.006* 0.004* -0.000 -0.001* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
PR 
  
0.014* 0.014* 
   
(0.000) (0.000)    
Financial market variables 
   SVOL 
 
-0.003* 
 
                
  
(0.000) 
 
                
FER 
 
-0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
  
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CRISK 
 
0.012* 0.011* 0.013* 
  
(0.000) (0.001) (0.001)    
Global factors 
    VIX 
  
-0.003*                 
   
(0.000)                 
L.VIX 
  
0.003*                 
   
(0.000)                 
TED 
   
-0.019* 
    
(0.001)    
L.TED 
   
0.097* 
    
(0.001)    
Bank-specific characteristics 
   NPL -0.017* -0.018* -0.019* -0.019* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
ROA 0.001** 0.008* 0.007* 0.007* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CAR -0.013* -0.014* -0.014* -0.014* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
TA 0.293* 0.273* 0.274* 0.274* 
 
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)    
LTD 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 0.002* 
 
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)    
CONS. -0.023 -0.128* -0.410* -0.471* 
 
(0.012) (0.015) (0.019) (0.015)    
No. of Obs. 1,688 1,658 1,658 1,658 
Banks (cross sections) 196 196 196 196 
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hansen test (p-value) 0.192 0.198 0.216 0.212 
AR(1) 0.005 0.000 0.000 0.000 
AR(2) 0.858 0.162 0.184 0.212 
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Notes:  *, ** represent statistical significance at levels of 1% and 5%.  Standard errors in parentheses. Global 
factors of VIX at current and lag levels were included in (3) and of TED were included in (4) to check the 
robustness of results.  SVOL variable was dropped from specification (3) & (4) to avoid multicollinearity 
problem as it was highly correlated with VIX & TED. 
 
5. Conclusions 
This paper investigates bank behaviour in the presence of macro-financial variability, 
which justifies the second round effects of the 2007-2009 global financial crisis on East 
Asia. Applying the partial adjustment models and dynamic panel data techniques with 
System-GMM estimation, the empirical results provide some evidence to confirm that 
volatility in the global financial markets and domestic macro-financial conditions 
negatively affect bank asset quality, profitability and lending behaviour. This means that 
deterioration in asset quality may reduce profitability and directly or indirectly weaken 
capital for banks that raise capital via retained earnings. There is also evidence to support 
the effect of macro-financial uncertainties on capital adjustment. As Asian banks are 
relatively conservative, they keep high capital regulatory ratios and tend to increase the 
capital buffers as a cushion to absorb negative shocks.  
In general, the findings suggest that good fundamentals and highly-capitalized banks do not 
guarantee a full decoupling from crisis contagion. In response to the crisis, especially to 
boost economies, stabilise financial markets and shore up the banking system, central 
banks introduced time-line policy interventions across the region. Complemented by fiscal 
stimulus packages, monetary policy measures were taken, including policy rates cuts, 
reserve requirement reductions, government injections of bank capital and quantitative 
easing. Specifically, the accumulated changes (in basis points) in policy rates for the period 
from September 2008 to 2009 are as follows: Indonesia (-225), Japan (-40), Korea (-325), 
Malaysia (-150), Philippines (-200), Thailand (-250) and Hong Kong (-300) (Filardo et al., 
2010). Although the empirical results could not provide convincing evidence to support the 
role of policy rate cuts to boost bank lending, it does not mean that the time-line policy 
intervention is ineffective but it raises the concern about the pass-through of policy rate 
cuts to borrowing cost. Moreover, an individual measure may not generate significant 
effects individually (Diemer & Vollmer, 2015), therefore a joint measure and 
comprehensive analysis of policy interventions and international cooperation in bank 
supervision should be examined in further research.  
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